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ABSTRACT 
A mathematical model for the specification and 
verification of a data link layer protocol is proposed. The 
weakest precondition calculus, developed by Dijkstra, 
originally for sequential programs, has been chosen for 
this purpose. It is demonstrated that the wp–calculus 
provides a basis, not only for the modeling but also, for a 
straightforward and thorough analysis of large and 
complex distributed systems like data link layer protocol. 
This analysis contributes to the understanding of the 
system and could lead to an improvement in the design. 
The technique has been illustrated by describing the 
sliding window protocol. 
Keywords: weakest precondition, guarded process, non-
deterministic selection, protocol, weakest cooperation, 
correctness 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Large number of formal methods exists to capture various 
types of systems. Hall in his Seven Myths[1] asserted that 
mathematics for specification should be easy. People find 
formal specifications difficult to read because of the large 
use of the symbols. The notational difficulties are more in 
writing specifications, due to the need for great attention 
to detail and correct use of mathematical statements. The 
weakest precondition (wp) calculus[2] uses first order 
predicate logic, which is very easy to apply. Moreover, 
through wp approach one can derive cause from effect, 
that is – precondition from post conditions. Therefore, it is 
much more sound[3]. Dijkstra developed it originally for 
reasoning about the correctness of sequential programs. 
We propose to extend the proof technology into the realm 
of modeling and reasoning about the correctness of 
distributed systems, in order that it can be applied to 
successfully verify either a component of a distributed 
system or an entire distributed system. 
Distributed system is a collection of processor–
memory pairs connected by a local area network or 
distributed over a large geographical area. The processors 
communicate in various unpredictable ways, because 
distributed systems are inherently concurrent, 
asynchronous and non-deterministic. These characteristics 
make them more complex than sequential systems [4]. 
Normally system specification depicts operational 
requirements and it does not include the properties like 
liveness, fairness, deadlock freedom, mutual exclusion, 
etc. Implementer’s goal should be to include these 
properties in order to achieve the correct system design. 
The design of distributed systems is known to be a 
complex task, because the behavior of a distributed 
system results from interactions between concurrent 
processes of which the system consists [5]. 
 
The classical example of distributed system is a 
well-known prototypical resource allocation system 
involving allocation of pair wise shared resources in a ring 
of processors, that is – dining philosophers system. Such 
systems can be successfully specified and verified using 
our proof technology [6]. However, in this type of system 
there is possibility of occurrence of only deadlock 
problem, hence the formal verification is easier. The 
distributed algorithms constitute a more complex class of 
distributed systems. Even though the code for a 
distributed algorithm may be short, the fact that many 
processors execute the code in parallel, with steps 
interleaved in some undetermined way, implies that there 
are many different ways in which the algorithm can 
behave, even for the same inputs. It is generally 
impossible to understand such algorithm by predicting 
exactly how it will execute. As many processes 
concurrently behave and timing conditions are strict, it is 
more difficult to verify them by any formal methodology. 
The processes of such system communicate through 
message transaction. In the centralized environment, the 
message transmitted by a process is almost guaranteed to 
reach at the site waiting for the message. The same is not 
always true in distributed environment. This fact 
complicates the system furthermore. Newmann [7] wrote, 
“Distributed systems have distributed risks”. The risks 
tend to increase and become more insidious as 
‘distributivity’ increases. Formal techniques can be used 
to reduce risks [8]. Here, we will use our technique for the 
same purpose. Let us consider a system with more 
‘distributivity’ where a message generated from a 
particular site is not guaranteed to reach the destination. 
We will investigate how our approach can be used to 
model and verify such systems.  
In order to ensure the correctness of a typical 
distributed system, in addition to deadlock freedom, the 
properties, like safety, liveness, and livelock freedom also, 
must be verified. All communication protocols do have 
these properties. We consider the sliding window 
protocol, one of the popular data link layer protocols. 
Since, this example presents a situation where all of the 
above enumerated properties can be verified, therefore, it 
lends itself as the most general and perfect candidate, not 
a mere case study, to test and manifest the power of any 
formal verification technique. 
Pnueli and Harel introduced the concept of a 
reactive system, a system whose behavior is characterized 
by non-termination and on-going interaction with an 
environment over which the system has little control [9]. 
Network protocols can be modeled as reactive systems 
[10]. The message transfer in sliding window protocol is 
through a channel. In order to simplify the problem, one 
may not assume the existence of the channel or one may 
assume the channel is co-operative one. But wp paradigm 
will not be of much interest when applied to this open 
system, which interacts with an environment. Thus one 
should assume a hostile environment [11]. Therefore, we 
assume the channel is noisy one. In order to specify 
sliding window protocol through weakest precondition 
logic, firstly we have modeled a noisy channel via this 
logic. The predicates to ensure correctness have been 
found on the basis of working of the protocol. Modeling is 
parallel to the communicating processes. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE WP–CALCULUS 
The specification language wp has – like every formal 
language – a well-defined syntax and semantics. An 
informal description based on a formal mathematical 
model is being given in the following paragraphs. 
A set P.X of states and a set P.R of state transition 
rules define a process P. On the similar lines a set S.P of 
processes interacting through message transactions define 
a system S. The predicate expression in(P.x) represents 
that a process P is in state P.x. The initial state of process, 
which is predefined, is denoted by initial(P.x0). The 
collection of states of all the processes belonging to set 
S.P is termed as state SX of the system S. 
A state transition rule represents the movement of 
process from one state to other. For firing any transition 
rule P.r there exist a corresponding weakest precondition 
wp(P.r, Q). If the system state satisfies the condition 
wp(P.r, Q) then execution of the transition rule P.r will 
eventually establish the post condition Q. This condition 
can be divided into two parts[12]. 
(i) wsp(P.r, Q), termed as weakest self pre-condition 
and is related to the process P itself.  
(ii) wcr(P.r, Q), termed as weakest co-operation 
requirements and includes the co-operation 
requirements from other processes. 
Thus, the total weakest precondition will be given by 
wp(P.r, Q) = wsp(P.r, Q) ∧ wcr(P.r, Q) 
Since, the co-operation requirements have already been 
included in the weakest precondition in this approach, 
separate proof of co-operation is not necessary here which 
was required in Chandi–Sanders approach[13]. Any 
transition rule P.r is described jointly by the weakest pre-
condition wp(P.r, Q) and the post condition Q.    
A non-deterministic state transition rule P.r may 
include number of different sub-rules each of which 
requires a definite pre-condition, called guard, to be 
satisfied for its execution. Execution of a sub-rule will 
change the state of the process P as well as the state of 
one of the co-operating processes whose active co-
operation is necessary for this execution. If the pre-
condition for more than one sub-rules are satisfied then 
one of them is selected, non-deterministically, for 
execution. Let there be n number of sub-rules denoted by 
P.ri : i = 1,…, n. On top of these sub-rules we assume a 
selector procedure, denoted by select, which makes the 
required non-deterministic selection. The post condition 
space for this procedure should therefore include a 
number of boolean variables denoted by  
si : i = 1,…, m . At each invocation the selector makes one 
such variable true. If a sub-rule P.ri has a post condition 
Qi
 then   
si  ⇒ wp(P.r
i, Qi) 
Let Bi denotes the required guard for P.r
i, then the truth of 
this condition should ensure the selectability of  si, i.e. ,  
Bi ⇒wr(select, si) 
Where, wr(select, si) is the weakest requirement that the 
procedure select may produce si. Using equations for si 
and Bi the rule P.r is described as follows: 
P.r :: 
Q ≡ ∃ i : Qi ; 
wp(P.r, Q) = (∃ k : Bk)  
∧ ( ∀ i  • Bi ⇒ wr(select, si))   
∧ ( ∀ j  • sj  ⇒ wp(P.rj, Qj)) ; 
end of  the transition rule P.r; 
The operational model can be described by state 
transition rules. These rules are completely defined by 
their weakest pre-condition pairs. However, operational 
specification may not be sufficient to include all the 
system requirements. One must also specify system 
properties that should be maintained before and after each 
state transition. Best way to do this is to construct a 
condition Q related to the system states and the property 
requirements, such that 
∀ i  • ∀ m  • {wp(Pi . rm , Qi , m) ⇒ Q} ∧ (Qi , m  ⇒ Q) 
In other words a system invariant must also be specified. 
For a guarded command the system invariant Q must 
follow a similar condition that is given by 
∀ i  • (Bi  ⇒ Q)  ∧  (Bi  ⇒ wp(P . ri , Qi ))  ∧  (Qi  ⇒ Q) 
 
3. SPECIFICATION OF A NOISY CHANNEL 
As given in [14], we consider a noisy channel that accepts 
messages for transmission. Depending on the noise 
condition during the transmission time, the message is 
presented at the output or it may be lost. We describe this 
channel as follows. We define the following states for the 
channel. 
 STATE SEMANTICS 
1. Channel_idle Channel is idle 
2. Channel_launched A frame has been launched 
on the Channel 
3. Channel_produced A frame is presented to the 
receiver 
 
We can now describe the behavior of the channel as 
follows. 
Process Channel (); 
States : channel_idle, channel_launched, 
channel_produced; 
Initial condition : in(channel_idle); 
Transition rules 
Channel . r1 
def Q=in(channel_launched); 
wsp(Channel . r1, Q)=in(channel_idle); 
wcr(Channel . r1, Q)=in(Ps . sent); 
 end of the transition rule Channel . r1; 
 Channel . r2 
def Q=Q1 ∨ Q2  
Q1=in(channel_produced); 
Q2=in(channel_idle) 
(in(channel_launched) ⇒ wp(Select, S1))  
∧ (in(channel_launched) ⇒ wp(Select, S2))  
∧ (S1 ⇒ wp(Channel . r2
1, Q1))  
∧ (S2 ⇒ wp(Channel . r2
2, Q2))  
end of the transition rule Channel . r2; 
end of transition rules; 
We assume a sender process Ps is running concurrently 
and moves to the state Ps . sent when it presents a 
message at the channel input. There exists another 
transition rule for the channel. When the receiver process 
receives the message the channel invokes another 
transition rule and moves to the idle state. 
 
4. FORMALIZATION OF THE SLIDING WINDOW 
PROTOCOL 
 
4.1 Informal Specification  
In sliding window protocol[15], each outbound frame 
contains a sequence number, ranging from 0 up to some 
maximum. At any instant of time, the sender maintains a 
fixed size buffer corresponding to set of frames, sent but 
yet not acknowledged, with their sequence numbers. This 
buffer is termed sender’s window. This storage is done for 
possible retransmission; since sent frames may ultimately 
be lost or damaged in transit. Since it has multiple 
outstanding frames, it maintains multiple logical timers, 
one per outstanding frame. Each frame times out 
independently of all the other once. Similarly the receiver 
also maintains a receiver’s window corresponding to the 
set of frames it is permitted to accept. The receiver has a 
buffer reserved for each sequence number within its 
window. Associated with each buffer is a bit telling 
whether the buffer is full or empty? Whenever a frame 
arrives, its sequence number is checked to see if it falls 
within the window. If so, and if it has not already been 
received, it is accepted and stored. An acknowledgement 
is sent also, if its predecessor frame has been 
acknowledged. Whenever the receiver has reason to 
suspect that an error has occurred, it sends a negative 
acknowledgement (NAK) frame back to the sender. Such 
a frame is a request for retransmission of the frame 
specified in the NAK. The Sender retransmits a frame, 
either on receiving NAK or on being timed out, whichever 
is earlier. Any frame falling outside the window is 
discarded without comment. The sender’s window and 
receiver’s window need not have the same lower and 
upper limits, or even have the same size. A frame buffer is 
released if buffer for its predecessor frame has already 
been released. Sender releases buffer after receiving 
acknowledgement while receiver does the same after 
sending acknowledgement. We define the states for 
different processes of the system as follows. 
 
4.2 Formal Specification 
Like in other modeling techniques, we also make certain 
assumptions, which provide framework for analysis of the 
system under consideration. Each process executes at non-
zero speed but we make no assumption on the relative 
speed of processes. Several CPUs may be present but 
memory hardware prevents simultaneous access to the 
same memory location. We also make no assumption 
about order of interleaved execution. Almost every model 
used for correctness analysis assumes that the execution 
of a concurrent system can be viewed in terms of events 
that can be considered atomic [16]. Our technique also 
views the execution of the system in terms of the atomic 
events. These events are communication with the other 
process, that is, a message transfer. Due to our assumption 
regarding atomicity, we can formalize a data link layer 
protocol as a state transition system. We have selected the 
sliding window protocol for this purpose. Now, we model 
the system by considering the presence of a set of 
processes in the system, namely 
1. sender process Ps, which sends frames in to the 
channel. 
2. receiver process Pr, which receives frames from the 
channel. 
3. Frame_OK is a flag, which shows that incoming frame 
does not contain any error. 
4. Timer process 
5. Win_rec is also a flag showing that the receiver process 
has received all frames of the current window. 
6. producer process Pp, which delivers frames to the 
sender process. 
 
4.2.1 States for the sender process Ps 
 STATE SEMANTICS 
1. Ps . rts_i Ps is ready to send 
frame_i 
2. Ps . sent_i Ps has sent frame_i 
3. Ps . rec_ack_i Ps has received 
acknowledgement for 
frame_i  
4. Ps . repeat_i Ps resends frame_i and 
restarts its local Timer 
5. Ps . rec_nak_i Ps has received negative 
acknowledgement for 
frame_i  
6. Ps . release_buf_i Ps has released buffer 
occupied by frame_i 
 
4.2.2 States for the receiver process Pr 
 
 STATE SEMANTICS 
1. Pr . rtr_i Pr is ready to receive 
frame_i 
2. Pr . rec_i Pr has received frame_i  
3. Pr . sent_ack_i Pr has sent 
acknowledgement for 
frame_i  
4. Pr . sent_nak_i Pr has sent negative 
acknowledgement for 
frame_i  
5. Pr . inbuf_i Pr has put frame_i in 
buffer 
6. Pr . release_buf_i Pr has released buffer 
occupied by frame_i 
7. Pr . no_accept_i Pr will not accept frame i 
 
4.2.3 States for Frame_OK flag 
 
 STATE SEMANTICS 
1. Frame_OK=true If the frame arrived at 
the receiver does not 
have any error 
2. Frame_OK=false If the frame arrived at 
the receiver has some 
error 
 
4.2.4 States for Timer process 
 
 STATE SEMANTICS 
1. Timer_idle_i Timer for frame_i is idle 
2. Timer_start_i Timer for frame_i starts 
3. Timer_end_i Timer for frame_i stops 
4. Timer_restart_i Timer for frame_i 
restarts 
 
4.2.5 States for Win_rec flag 
 
 STATE SEMANTICS 
1. Win_rec=false All frames related to 
current window have not 
been received, except 
frame i 
2. Win_rec=true All frames related to 
current window have 
been received, except 
frame i 
 
4.2.6 States for the producer process Pp 
 
 STATE SEMANTICS 
1. Pp . idle Producer is idle 
2. Pp . produced_i Producer has delivered 
frame i to sender process 
 
With reference to the above states we can describe the 
processes. 
4.2.7 Process Ps: identified by Ps; initialized as 
in(Ps . rts_i) 
Transition rule 
Let, 
Ws = size of sender’s window  
i = frame in sender’s window where i will assume values 
0, 1, …, (Ws – 1) in sequence 
j = next frame in sender’s window such that j = (i + 1) 
mod Ws  
k = arbitrary frame in sender’s window  
i′= first frame in sender’s window after sliding such that 
i′= k + 1 
The range of values assumed by i′ is same as i. 
Ps . send_frame 
def Q1=in(Ps . rts_j) ∧ in(Ps . sent_i) ∧ in(Timer_start_i) 
∧ in(Channel_launched) 
Q2=in(Ps . release_buf_i) ∧ in(Timer_end_i)  
∧ in(Ps . rts_j) ∧ in(Ps . rec_ack_i) 
Q3=in(Ps . repeat_i) ∧ in(Timer_restart_i) ∧ in(Ps . rts_k) 
∧ in(Ps . rec_nak_i) 
Q4=in(Ps . repeat_i) ∧ in(Timer_restart_i) ∧ in(Ps . rts_k) 
Q5=in(Ps . release_buf_i-to-k) ∧ in(Ps . rts_ i′ ) 
Q=Q1 ∨ Q2 ∨ Q3 ∨ Q4 ∨ Q5 
B1=in(Ps . rts_i) ∧ in(Pp . produced_i) 
B2=in(Ps . sent_i) ∧ in(Timer_start_i)  
∧ in(Channel_produce_ack_i) 
B3=in(Ps . rts_k) ∧ in(Channel_produce_nak_i) 
B4=in(Ps . rts_k) ∧ in(Timer_end_i) 
B5=in(Ps . repeat_i) ∧ in(Channel_produce_ack_k) 
wp(Ps . send_frame, Q) =(B1 ∨ B2 ∨ B3 ∨ B4 ∨ B5)  
∧ (B1⇒wr(select, in(Ps . send_frame . s1)))  
∧ (B2⇒wr(select, in(Ps . send_frame . s2)))  
∧ (B3⇒wr(select, in(Ps . send_frame . s3)))  
∧ (B4⇒wr(select, in(Ps . send_frame . s4)))  
∧ (B5⇒wr(select, in(Ps . send_frame . s5)))  
∧ (in(Ps . send_frame . s1)⇒wp(Ps . send_frame1, Q1))  
∧ (in(Ps . send_frame . s2)⇒wp(Ps . send_frame2, Q2))  
∧ (in(Ps . send_frame . s3)⇒wp(Ps . send_frame3, Q3))  
∧ (in(Ps . send_frame . s4)⇒wp(Ps . send_frame4, Q4))  
∧ (in(Ps . send_frame . s5)⇒wp(Ps . send_frame5, Q5))  
End of the transition rule Ps . send_frame ; 
End of the process Ps ; 
4.2.8 Process Pr:  identified by Pr; initialized as 
in(Pr . rtr_i) 
Transition rule 
Let, 
Wr = size of receiver’s window  
i = frame in receiver’s window where i will assume values 
0, 1, …, (Wr – 1) in sequence 
j = next frame in receiver’s window such that  
j = (i + 1) mod Wr  
k = arbitrary frame in receiver’s window  
i′= first frame in receiver’s window after sliding such 
that i′= k + 1 
The range of values assumed by i′ is same as i. 
Pr . receive_frame 
def Q1= in(Pr . rec_i) ∧ in(Pr . rtr_j) ∧ in(Pr . sent_ack_i) 
∧ in(Pr . release_buf_i) ∧ in(Win_rec=false) 
Q2=in(Pr . rtr_i) ∧ in(Pr . inbuf_k) 
Q3= in(Pr . rec_i) ∧ in(Pr . rtr_ i′ ) ∧ in(Pr . sent_ack_k)  
∧ in(Pr . release_buf_i-to-k) ∧ in(Win_rec=true) 
Q4=in(Pr . rtr_i) ∧ in(Pr . sent_nak_i) 
Q5=in(Pr . no_accept_k) 
Q=Q1 ∨ Q2 ∨ Q3 ∨ Q4 ∨ Q5 
B1=in(Pr . rtr_i) ∧ in(Channel_produce_i)  
∧ in(Frame_i_OK=true) 
B2=in(Pr . rtr_i) ∧ in(Channel_produce_k)  
∧ in(Frame_k_OK=true) ∧ ¬in(Pr . inbuf_k) 
B3=in(Pr . rtr_i) ∧ in(Channel_produce_i)  
∧ in(Pr . inbuf_j-to-k) ∧ in(Frame_i_OK=true) 
B4=in(Pr . rtr_i) ∧ in(Channel_produce_i)  
∧ in(Frame_i_OK=false)  
B5=in(Pr . inbuf_k) ∧ in(Channel_produce_k) 
wp(Pr . receive_frame, Q) =(B1 ∨ B2 ∨ B3 ∨ B4 ∨ B5)  
∧ (B1⇒wr(select, in(Pr . receive_frame . s1)))  
∧ (B2⇒wr(select, in(Pr . receive_frame . s2)))  
∧ (B3⇒wr(select, in(Pr . receive_frame . s3)))  
∧ (B4⇒wr(select, in(Pr . receive_frame . s4)))  
∧ (B5⇒wr(select, in(Pr . receive_frame . s5)))  
∧ {(in(Pr . receive_frame . s1)⇒ 
wp(Pr . receive_frame1, Q1))}  
∧ {(in(Pr . receive_frame . s2)⇒ 
wp(Pr . receive_frame2, Q2))}  
∧ {(in(Pr . receive_frame . s3)⇒ 
wp(Pr . receive_frame3, Q3))}  
∧ {(in(Pr . receive_frame . s4)⇒ 
wp(Pr . receive_frame4, Q4))}  
∧ {(in(Pr . receive_frame . s5)⇒ 
wp(Pr . receive_frame5, Q5))}  
End of the transition rule Pr . receive_frame ; 
End of the process Pr ; 
 
4.3 PROOF OF CORRECTNESS 
We define an operator “leads to” (symbolized as “→ ”) 
in wp environment with the following semantics. 
B→Q implies ∃r : wp(r, Q) = B           (1) 
where B and Q are guards and post-conditions 
respectively corresponding to transition rule r. In order to 
function properly the protocol must satisfy both, the safety 
and liveness properties. 
4.3.1 Safety property 
All frames must be received without repetition. We will 
prove it in two parts. 
(a) Transition rule B5→Q5 of receiver process reveals 
that weakest precondition for not accepted frame k is 
“frame k is already in buffer of receiver”. Thus any 
frame once received will never be received again. 
(b) ‘All’ frames must be received. We interpret, “if all 
frames of current window are received, only then 
receiver should become ready to receive first frame 
of next window”. This condition can be represented 
in predicate form as follows. 
in(Pr . rec_i) ∧ in(Win_rec=true) →  in(Pr . rtr_m)      (2) 
As defined previously m= i′ , where i′ is sequence 
number of first frame in next window. 
Transition rule B3→Q3 exhibits that 
B3→  {in(Pr . rec_i) ∧ in(Win_rec=true)  
∧ in(Pr . rtr_m) ∧ I}             (3) 
Where I= in(Pr . sent_ack_k) ∧ in(Pr . release_buf_i-to-k) 
Also the predicate shown in Eq. (2) is weaker than that of 
in Eq. (3). Thus correctness of the predicate shown in Eq. 
(2) is ensured. 
4.3.2 Liveness property 
All frames must be transmitted with finite delay. 
Transition rule B1→Q1 of the sender process reveals 
that transition from ready to send frame i to ready to send 
frame j (where j=i+1) needs no co-operation from any 
other process except it’s producer process. Producer 
process supplies frames from upper layer to sender 
process. Thus, every frame supplied by producer process 
will eventually be transmitted. 
4.3.3 Deadlock freedom 
We observe, mainly sender process ensures liveness and 
receiver process ensures safety. Sender and receiver are 
two non-competing processes, represented through 
guarded commands. In guarded commands, though more 
than one guards can be true at a time, only one true guard 
will be selected and corresponding statement will be 
executed. Thus deadlock freedom is ensured.  
4.3.4 Livelock freedom 
Assume that acknowledgement of some frame i is lost in 
the channel. Subsequently, timer for frame i will expire, 
sender will transmit frame i again and restart it’s timer. 
Receiver sends acknowledgement for any particular frame 
at most once. Thus, sender will never receive the 
acknowledgement for frame i and will be livelocked in 
transmitting frame i. 
In order to prevent this situation, while 
repeatedly sending a particular frame, say i, if channel 
produces acknowledgement for a frame with higher 
sequence number, say k, then buffer for all frames having 
sequence numbers less than or equal to k are released, that 
is, window slides. In other words, sender becomes ready 
to send first frame of next window. We interpret, “if 
sender transmits a frame then corresponding buffer would 
eventually be released irrespective of acknowledgement 
reception. Following predicate can represent this. 
{in(Ps . repeat_i) ∧ in(Channel_produce_ack_k)} →   
{in(Ps . release_buf_i-to-k) ∧ in(Ps . rts_m)} 
Recall that m= i′ , where i′ is sequence number of first 
frame in next window. 
This is fully guarded by B5→Q5 of sender process. 
Thus, live-lock condition will never occur. 
 
5. COMPARISON WITH TLA APPROACH 
One of the popular techniques for verifying systems is 
Temporal Logic of Actions abbreviated as TLA. There all 
specifications, including the requirement, have the form of 
a state machine [17] and the specified actions describe the 
transition between the states. In order to distinguish 
between the value before and after the action was 
executed, the prime operator is introduced. The definition 
of action describes the behavior of distinct variables that 
change values as well as the remaining free variables that 
are left unchanged. UNCHANGED statements for the 
remaining variables have supplemented the definition. 
Similarly additional action operators are provided which 
allow to state whether an action affects a variable. What 
remains unchanged is stated in TLA action definition; and 
how the control state changes is described in the TLA 
formula [18].  
#1 Any action can only be executed if it is enabled. 
Thus, along with action definitions enabling 
conditions are also taken care for all actions, 
deterministic and non-deterministic. In present 
approach using guarded command, one guard has to 
be made true before the corresponding transition rule 
is executed. However, it is not required in 
deterministic type of actions. Hence specification is 
shorter than TLA formula and proofs of various 
properties are less complicated. 
#2 TLA provides a clear separation between safety and 
liveness properties. The specifications in [19, 20] 
concern only safety properties. It involves very long 
and tiresome proof. In order to obtain complete 
specifications it will require another effort, to the 
tune of similar size and complexity, in order to prove 
liveness properties. 
#3 In order to introduce full de-coupling between sender 
and receiver, [19, 20] requires two communication 
channels, which is reduced to one in our work using 
weakest pre-condition modeling approach. 
#4 Sliding Window re-transmission mechanism has 
been modeled with linear arithmetic in [19, 20]. 
Modular arithmetic has the advantage of partitioning 
the long proof in to smaller ones. At the same time it 
introduces an overhead also. One has to include a 
series of proofs exhibiting the fact that each module 
implements its predecessor, who is not needed in 
linear arithmetic, used by us. 
#5 Getting the invariant of implementation that is, lower 
level specification correctly implements a higher-
level one [21], used for the refinement mapping 
proof, is also tedious. There is no systematic method 
to invent the suited invariant for the refinement 
proof. It relies on the experience gained from a deep 
study of the problem in question [22]. Moreover 
these refinement proofs are not simple. The proof is 
straightforward only when mapping does not 
introduce stuttering steps. Similar overheads are 
absent in out approach. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have shown how a distributed system may be 
represented by using the notation of the weakest pre-
condition calculus through the example of sliding window 
protocol. Any distributed system consists of a collection 
of communicating processes, and these processes can be 
modeled in this notation. Thus any distributed system may 
be modeled in the notation. The goal was to formalize and 
prove its correctness. As the example, considered here, 
includes almost all desirable properties of a typical 
distributed system, it proves, without loss of generality, 
the effectiveness of our proof technology to verify the 
correctness of any distributed system. Although we have 
used first order logic, accuracy has not been compromised 
for the sake of simplicity. It also demonstrates the 
suitability of the weakest precondition calculus for 
evaluating the correctness of the class of distributed 
systems that communicate through message transaction. 
A preliminary version of this work has appeared in 
[23]. The present exposition is an extension of our earlier 
work and is more exhaustive, free from some anomalies 
pointed out during presentation of the preliminary version. 
The proofs of properties are simpler and easier to 
understand. 
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